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COMMENTARIES ON PROFESSOR SNEED'S LECTURE
WALTER J. B.-mr*
The task of a commentator is invariably more difficult when he agrees
with the views which have been presented. It is always easier to attack and more
stimulating to take issue. Unfortunately, I find myself in agreement with most
of what Sneed has said, and it is only my emphasis that is somewhat different.
First a general background note. I do not dissent from Sneed's proposition
that in the world of today, and most likely in the world of tomorrow, heavy
taxes will be with us and maintenance of our position of strength in the world
will require them. But I would insert an important caveat. I think we should
be careful that what Sneed calls our commitment to greatness is not used
as a cover for a wide variety of government activities which make a doubtful
contribution to our greatness. Otherwise, the political-economic system which
has produced our greatness might itself be weakened and, in the process, perhaps
also our greatness.
Turning to Sneed's central theme, no one can doubt that federal tax law
has had an important impact on private law and that the impact has taken the
three forms that Sneed has so clearly outlined. However, I suggest that his
presentation may possibly be misleading if it gives the impression that changes
in our private law attributable to our federal tax law bulk large. Substantial
they are; but not of giant proportions. In fact, the totality of change which
has occurred in our massive body of private law has itself been relatively
modest, and this is what might be expected in a society in which private
property plays a dominant role and which regards gradual change, rather
than revolutionary change, as a major virtue. Lawyers of my generation should
not be surprised to learn that while their law school course notes in taxation,
labor law and other public law fields are hopelessly outdated, the main body of
their notes in agency, torts, contracts, property and evidence probably need
only slight updating-provided, of course, they were reasonably well designed
at the start. And of that fraction of private law which has changed, I suggest
that only a relatively small part has been in response to tax stimuli. As a
convenient yardstick for this purpose, it might be observed that two much more
potent forces for change in recent decades have been, first, the move to promote
uniform private law throughout the states and, second, the ever present drive
in some quarters for further codification of decisional law. Nevertheless, it is
abundantly clear that the tax induced changes in private law are far from
insignificant.
Moving to Sneed's analysis, I cannot get very excited over the matters
covered by his first category-the distortion, corruption or reinforcement of
private law by tax law. The essence of these operations is clear. Courts
sometimes seize upon results in tax cases to justify a decision in a private law
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case without properly considering that the relevant purpose behind the tax
rule may be wholly different from the purpose to be served by the private law
rule. Sneed is sound in deploring this confusion even when by happenstance it
produces a desirable private law result. My lack of excitement over the
process is not due to disinterest. Rather it stems from the fact that this kind
of confusion can be found all over the judicial lot, and there is nothing
particularly novel or provoking when an undiscriminating opinion happens to
borrow wrongly from tax law rather than from some other area of law.
The amplification aspect of tax law's impact on private law, Sneed's
second category, is to me far more interesting. It is quite intriguing to watch
private law struggling to develop rules which are needed only because tax law
has posed questions that previously were unrecognized or lacked significance.
But in observing this process, we should remain aware that it is only one side
of a greater drama. Sharing the stage is the resourcefulness of taxpayers and
their advisors in working out the many tax savings arrangements which then
call for the amplification of private law. This resourcefulness on the part
of tax experts is perhaps most striking when an old form or old device, nearly
fallen into obscurity, is resurrected to live a new life under completely altered
circumstances. The revival of powers of appointment in estate planning serves
as a perfect illustration of this point. What I am urging here is that the wonders
of such virtuosity on the part of tax experts should not be neglected when we
concentrate on the amplification of private law. To a degree, the amplification
of private law is in response not only to taxes but to the ingenuity of tax
planners, spurred on by the tax law.
Regarding Sneed's third category, the creative response of private law
to tax law, I would emphasize two points. First is the fact that the reaction
of state legislatures to a tax stimulus is often surprisingly slow considering its
pecuniary potency. It took years before more than a few states moved toward
shifting from a common law to a community property system of ownership
in order to gain the tax advantage of income splitting for their citizens. Again,
the divergent treatment for gift tax purposes of a renounced legacy, on the one
hand, and a rejected inheritance, on the other, was pretty old stuff before state
laws undertook to put them on an equal tax footing by authorizing the dis-
claimer. of property received through intestate succession. And to take another
of Sneed's illustrations, the gift tax implication of support obligations were well
publicized before proposed changes in state law appeared on the scene. This
is not to say the creative response is never rapid. The recent flood of professional
association legislation, following publication of Treasury regulations on the
subject, testifies forcefully to the contrary. On the whole, however, the pace
of reaction has been moderate and it is my guess that in relatively few instances
is it likely to be very swift. But whatever the speed of the legislative reaction,
I would not weaken Sneed's package of advice to tax law-makers and private
law-makers. His guidelines are fundamentally sound.
IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXATION
The second point I would emphasize in connection with the creative aspect
of tax law is that the responses of private law are sometimes in themselves
distortions. They represent legislative decisions on private law matters which
probably would not have been acceptable in the absence of tax considerations.
What is good for taxation is not necessarily otherwise good for the country.
I am somewhat disappointed that time did not permit Sneed to develop
the point that tax law has spawned a sizable amount of friendly state-court
litigation designed to recast transactions or to reform instruments in order to
put the friendly group of litigants in a better federal tax position. Perhaps
only in a strained sense can such judicial activity be considered an alteration
of substantive private law. This sympathetic judicial response, however, has
an important bearing on the operation of our system of private law. It tends to
set a tone that is not easily forgotten. The actual magnitude of such sympathetic
response is very hard to gauge inasmuch as many of the decisions go un-
recorded or unnoticed. But there is ample evidence that numerous state courts
have repeatedly been more than lenient, if not virtually compliant, in back-
stopping poor draftsmanship or bad planning, all at the expense of the federal
revenues. I cannot believe that such performances increase the prestige of the
judiciary or produce a desirable climate for the dispensation of justice.
Finally, I join Sneed in predicting that the processes of what he terms
fiscalizing our private law in response to tax law probably will continue unabated.
In many respects our federal tax system seems to have a dominant characteristic:
it continues to keep moving in the direction it is already going.
ERNEsT J. BROWN*
I can't enter into whatever area of disagreement there may be between
Mr. Sneed and Mr. Blum on the amount or pace of change the tax law has
brought into private law. It exists, and that is perhaps the most significant
thing. I am interested in exploring elements which may be obvious. But it may
be of some advantage to make them explicit. These are the elements of the
framework of Mr. Sneed's very fruitful inquiry. It is, as so many things are
with us, an exploration into our federalism. Of course, it is nothing new to
have taxes and tax law influence private law and private institutions. The
feudal equivalent of taxation was at least one of the stimuli that ultimately
resulted in the law of trusts. In our own country when the Supreme Court
was unable to discover constitutional restraints of any great rigor on the
rather ambitious reach of state inheritance taxation and state franchise taxation,
the personal holding company emerged as a check on the former and the intricate
proliferation of subsidiary and affiliated business corporations helped to check
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